Tide Clocks

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the principles of Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz applied to the Syrian and Egyptian attack on Israel in October 1973. The Yom Kippur War provides examples of situations where the principles of these two military strategists were both  followed and ignored. Finally, the paper concludes with an assessment of what the result of the war was and a discussion about whether the principles of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are valid for modern warfare. INTRODUCTION At approximately 1400 hours on Saturday, October 6, 1973, Syrian and Egyptian forces attacked Israeli positions in the Golan Heights and along the Suez Canal. The Yom Kippur War, also known as the October War or the War of Ramadan, caught the Israelis completely by surprise. Before the outbreak of hostilities, it was widely accepted that any war in the Middle East would be decided in a matter of days by an overwhelming Israeli victory. Contrary to popular belief, the fighting lasted for over two weeks and resulted in heavier than expected Israeli losses. When the parties stopped fighting, the state of Israel had suffered “…at least 2,569 dead and 7,500 wounded” (Cohen, 95). The degree of loss cannot be overstated. The Israelis, with respect to population, suffered a loss rate “…more than 30 times as great as the American loss rate in World War II” (Dupuy, 603). Sun Tzu warned of hostilities that last longer than expected when he said, “Victory is the main object in war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed…Thus while we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged” (Handel, 89).